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Mr. HENRY. Mr. Chairman, I am much obliged to the very聽worthy gentleman for his encomium. I wish I was possessed with talents, or聽possessed of any thing that might enable me to elucidate this great subject. I聽am not free from suspicion: I am apt to entertain doubts. I rose yesterday to聽ask a question which arose in my own mind. When I asked that question, I thought聽the meaning of my interrogation was obvious. The fate of this question and of聽America may depend on this. Have they said, We, the states? Have they made a聽proposal of a compact between states? If they had, this would be a聽confederation. It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government. The聽question turns, sir, on that poor little thing–the expression, We, the 聽people, instead of the states, of America. I need not take much pains聽to show that the principles of this system are extremely pernicious, impolitic,聽and dangerous. Is this a monarchy, like England– a compact between prince and聽people, with checks on the former to secure the liberty of the latter? Is this a聽confederacy, like Holland–an association of a number of independent states,聽each of which retains its individual sovereignty? It is not a democracy, wherein聽the people retain all their rights securely. Had these principles been adhered聽to, we should not have been brought to this alarming transition, from a聽confederacy to a consolidated government. We have no detail of these great聽consideration, which, in my opinion, ought to have abounded before we should聽recur to a government of this kind. Here is a resolution as radical as that聽which separated us from Great Britain. It is radical in this transition; our聽rights and privileges are endangered, and the sovereignty of the states will be聽relinquished: and cannot we plainly see that this is actually the case? The聽rights of conscience, trial by jury, liberty of the press, all your immunities聽and franchises, all pretensions to human rights and privileges, are rendered聽insecure, if not lost, by this change, so loudly talked of by some, and聽inconsiderately by others. Is this tame relinquishment of rights worthy of聽freemen? Is it worthy of that manly fortitude that ought to characterize republicans? It is said eight states have adopted this plan. I declare that if聽twelve states and a half had adopted it, I would, with manly firmness, and in聽spite of an erring world, reject it. You are not to inquire how your trade may聽be increased, nor how you are to become a great and powerful people, but聽how your liberties can be secured; for liberty ought to be the direct end of聽your government.

Having premised these things, I shall, with the aid of my聽judgment and information, which, I confess, are not extensive, go into the聽discussion of this system more minutely. Is it necessary for your liberty that聽you should abandon those great rights by the adoption of this system? Is the聽relinquishment of the trial by jury and the liberty of the press necessary for聽your liberty? Will the abandonment of your most sacred rights tend to the聽security of your liberty? Liberty, the greatest of all earthly blessing– give聽us that precious jewel, and you may take every thing else! But I am fearful I聽have lived long enough to become an old-fashioned fellow. Perhaps an invincible聽attachment to the dearest rights of man may, in these refined, enlightened days,聽be deemed old-fashioned; if so, I am contented to be so. I say, the time has聽been when every pulse of my heart beat for American liberty, and which, I believe, had a counterpart in the breast of every true American; but suspicions聽have gone forth–suspicions of my integrity– publicly reported that my聽professions are not real. Twenty-three years ago was I supposed a traitor to my聽country? I was then said to be the bane of sedition, because I supported the聽rights of my country. I may be thought suspicious when I say our privileges and聽rights are in danger. But, sir, a number of the people of this country are weak聽enough to think these things are too true. I am happy to find that the gentleman聽on the other side declares they are groundless. But, sir, suspicion is a virtue聽as long as its object is the preservation of the public good, and as long as it聽stays within proper bounds: should it fall on me, I am contented: conscious聽rectitude is a powerful consolation. I trust there are many who think my聽professions for the public good to be real. Let your suspicion look to both聽sides. There are many on the other side, who possibly may have been persuaded to聽the necessity of these measures, which I conceive to be dangerous to your聽liberty. Guard with jealous attention the public liberty. Suspect every one who聽approaches that jewel. Unfortunately, nothing will preserve it but downright聽force. Whenever you give up that force, you are inevitably ruined. I am answered聽by gentlemen, that, though I might speak of terrors, yet the fact was, that we聽were surrounded by none of the dangers I apprehended. I conceive this new聽government to be one of those dangers: it has produced those horrors which聽distress many of our best citizens. We are come hither to preserve the poor聽commonwealth of Virginia, if it can be possibly done: something must be done to聽preserve your liberty and mine. The Confederation, this same despised聽government, merits, in my opinion, the highest encomium: it carried us through a聽long and dangerous war; it rendered us victorious in that bloody conflict with a聽powerful nation; it has secured us a territory greater than any European monarch possesses: and shall a government which has been thus strong and vigorous, be聽accused of imbecility, and abandoned for want of energy? Consider what you are聽about to do before you part with the government. Take longer time in reckoning聽things; revolutions like this have happened in almost every country in Europe;聽similar examples are to be found in ancient Greece and ancient Rome–instances聽of the people losing their liberty by their own carelessness and the ambition of聽a few. We are cautioned by the honorable gentleman, who presides, against聽faction and turbulence. I acknowledge that licentiousness is dangerous, and that聽it ought to be provided against: I acknowledge, also, the new form of government聽may effectually prevent it: yet there is another thing it will as effectually do–it will oppress and ruin the people.

There are sufficient guards placed against sedition and聽licentiousness; for, when power is given to this government to suppress these,聽or for any other purpose, the language it assumes is clear, express, and聽unequivocal; but when this Constitution speaks of privileges, there is an聽ambiguity, sir, a fatal ambiguity–an ambiguity which is very astonishing. In聽the clause under consideration, there is the strangest language that I can聽conceive. I mean, when it says that there shall not be more representatives than聽one for every thirty thousand. Now, sir, how easy is it to evade this privilege!聽“The number shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand.” This may be聽satisfied by one representative from each state. Let our numbers be ever so聽great, this immense continent may, by this artful expression, be reduced to have聽but thirteen representatives. I confess this construction is not natural; but聽the ambiguity of the expression lays a good ground for a quarrel. Why was it not聽clearly and unequivocally expressed, that they should be entitled to have聽one for every thirty thousand? This would have obviated all disputes; and was聽this difficult to be done? What is the inference? When population increases, and聽a state shall send representatives in this proportion, Congress may remand them,聽because the right of having one for every thirty thousand is not clearly聽expressed. This possibility of reducing the number to one for each state聽approximates to probability by that other expression– “but each state shall at聽least have one representative.” Now, is it not clear that, from the first聽expression, the number might be reduced so much that some states should have no聽representatives at all, were it not for the insertion of this last expression?聽And as this is the only restriction upon them, we may fairly conclude that they聽may restrain the number to one from each state. Perhaps the same horrors may聽hang over my mind again. I shall be told I am continually afraid: but, sir, I聽have strong cause of apprehension. In some parts of the plan before you, the聽great rights of freemen are endangered; in other parts, absolutely taken away.聽How does your trial by jury stand? In civil cases gone–not sufficiently聽secured in criminal–this best privilege is gone. But we are told that we need聽not fear; because those in power, being our representatives, will not abuse the聽powers we put in their hands. I am not well versed in history, but I will submit聽to your recollection, whether liberty has been destroyed most often by the聽licentiousness of the people, or by the tyranny of rulers. I imagine, sir, you聽will find the balance on the side of tyranny. Happy will you be if you miss the聽fate of those nations, who, omitting to resist their oppressors, or negligently聽suffering their liberty to be wrested from them, have groaned under intolerable聽despotism! Most of the human race are now in this deplorable condition; and聽those nations who have gone in search of grandeur, power, and splendor, have聽also fallen a sacrifice, and been the victims of their own folly. While they聽acquired those visionary blessings, they lost their freedom. My great objection聽to this government is, that it does not leave us the means of defending our聽rights, or of waging war against tyrants. It is urged by some gentlemen, that聽this new plan will bring us an acquisition of strength–an army, and the聽militia of the states. This is an idea extremely ridiculous: gentlemen cannot be聽earnest. This acquisition will trample on our fallen liberty. Let my聽beloved Americans guard against that fatal lethargy that has pervaded the聽universe. Have we the means of resisting disciplined armies, when our only defence, the militia, is put into the hands of Congress? The honorable gentleman聽said that great danger would ensue if the Convention rose without adopting this聽system. I ask, Where is that danger? I see none. Other gentlemen have told us,聽within these walls, that the union is gone, or that the union will be gone. Is聽not this trifling with the judgment of their fellow-citizens? Till they tell us聽the grounds of their fears, I will consider them as imaginary. I rose to make聽inquiry where those dangers were; they could make no answer: I believe I never聽shall have that answer. Is there a disposition in the people of this country to聽revolt against the dominion of laws? Has there been a single tumult in Virginia?聽Have not the people of Virginia, when laboring under the severest pressure of聽accumulated distresses, manifested the most cordial acquiescence in the聽execution of the laws? What could be more awful than their unanimous聽acquiescence under general distresses? Is there any revolution in Virginia?聽Whither is the spirit of America gone? Whither is the genius of America fled? It聽was but yesterday, when our enemies marched in triumph through our country. Yet聽the people of this country could not be appalled by their pompous armaments:聽they stopped their carer, and victoriously captured them. Where is the peril,聽now, compared to that? Some minds are agitated by foreign alarms. Happily for聽us, there is no real danger from Europe; that country is engaged in more arduous聽business: from that quarter there is no cause of fear: you may sleep in safety聽forever for them.

Where is the danger? If, sir, there was any, I would recur to聽the American spirit to defend us; that spirit which has enabled us to surmount聽the greatest difficulties: to that illustrious spirit I address my most fervent聽prayer to prevent our adopting a system destructive to liberty. Let not聽gentlemen be told that it is not safe to reject this government. Wherefore is it聽not safe? We are told there are dangers, but those dangers are ideal; they聽cannot be demonstrated. To encourage us to adopt it, they tell us that there is聽a plain, easy way of getting amendments. When I come to contemplate this part, I聽suppose that I am mad, or that my countrymen are so. The way to amendment聽is, in my conception, shut. Let us consider this plain, easy way. “The Congress,聽whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose聽amendments to this Constitution, or, on the application of the legislatures of聽two thirds of the several states, shall call a Convention for proposing聽amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes,聽as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths聽of the several states, or by the Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the聽one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the Congress. Provided,聽that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 1808, shall in any manner聽affect the 1st and 4th clauses in the 9th section of the 1st article; and that聽no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the聽Senate.”

Hence it appears that three fourths of the states must聽ultimately agree to any amendments that may be necessary. Let us consider the聽consequence of this. However uncharitable it may appear, yet I must tell my聽opinion–that the most unworthy characters may get into power, and prevent the聽introduction of amendments. Let us suppose –for the case is supposable,聽possible, and probable–that you happen to deal those powers to unworthy hands;聽will they relinquish powers already in their possession, or agree to amendments?聽Two thirds of the Congress, or of the state legislatures, are necessary even to聽propose amendments. If one third of these be unworthy men, they may prevent the聽application for amendments; but what is destructive and mischievous, is, that聽three fourths of the state legislatures, or of the state conventions, must聽concur in the amendments when proposed! In such numerous bodies, there must聽necessarily be some designing, bad men. To suppose that so large a number as聽three fourths of the states will concur, is to suppose that they will possess聽genius, intelligence, and integrity, approaching to miraculous. It would indeed聽be miraculous that they should concur in the same amendments, or even in such as聽would bear some likeness to one another; for four of the smallest states, that聽do not collectively contain one tenth part of the population of the United聽States, may obstruct the most salutary and necessary amendments. Nay, in these聽four states, six tenths of the people may reject these amendments; and聽suppose that amendments shall be opposed to amendments, which is highly聽probable,–is it possible that three fourths can ever agree to the same聽amendments? A bare majority in these four small states may hinder the adoption聽of amendments; so that we may fairly and justly conclude that one twentieth part聽of the American people may prevent the removal of the most grievous聽inconveniences and oppression, by refusing to accede to amendments. A trifling聽minority may reject 聽the most salutary amendments. Is this an easy mode of聽securing the public liberty It is, sir, a most fearful situation, when the most聽contemptible minority can prevent the alteration of the most oppressive聽government; for it may, in many respects, prove to be such. Is this the spirit聽of republicanism?

What, sir, is the genius of democracy? Let me read that clause聽of the bill of rights of Virginia which relates to this: 3d clause: –that聽government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection,聽and security of the people, nation, or community. Of all the various modes and聽forms of government, that is best, which is capable of producing the greatest聽degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured against the聽danger of mal-administration; and that whenever any government shall be found聽inadequate, or contrary to those purposes, a majority of the community hath an聽indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish聽it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.

This, sir, is the language of democracy–that a majority of聽the community have a right to alter government when found to be oppressive. But聽how different is the genius of your new Constitution from this! How different聽from the sentiments of freemen, that a contemptible minority can prevent the聽good of the majority! If, then, gentlemen, standing on this ground, are come to聽that point, that they are willing to bind themselves and their posterity to be聽oppressed, I am amazed and inexpressibly astonished. If this be the opinion of聽the majority, I must submit; but to me, sir, it appears perilous and聽destructive. I cannot help thinking so. Perhaps it may be the result of my age.聽These may be feelings natural to a man of my years, when the American spirit has聽left him, and his mental powers, like the members of the body, are decayed. If,聽sir, amendments are left to the twentieth, or tenth part of the people of聽America, your liberty is gone forever. We have heard that there is a great deal聽of bribery practised in the House of Commons, in England, and that many of the聽members raise themselves to preferments by selling the rights of the whole of聽the people. But, sir, the tenth part of that body cannot continue oppression on聽the rest of the people. English liberty is, in this case, on a firmer foundation聽than American liberty. It will be easily contrived to procure the opposition of聽one tenth of the people to any alteration, however judicious. The honorable聽gentleman who presides told us that, to prevent abuses in our government, we聽will assemble in Convention, recall our delegated powers, and punish our聽servants for abusing the trust reposed in them. O sir, we should have fine聽times, indeed, if, to punish tyrants, it were only sufficient to assemble the聽people! Your arms, wherewith you could defend yourselves, are gone; and you have聽no longer an aristocratical, no longer a democratical spirit. Did you ever read聽of any revolution in a nation, brought about by the punishment of those in聽power, inflicted by those who had no power at all? You read of a riot act in a聽country which is called one of the freest in the world, where a few neighbors聽cannot assemble without the risk of being shot by a hired soldiery, the engines聽of despotism. We may see such an act in America.

A standing army we shall have, also, to execute the execrable聽commands of tyranny; and how are you to punish them? Will you order them to be聽punished? Who shall obey these orders? Will your mace-bearer be a match for a聽disciplined regiment? In what situation are we to be? The clause before you聽gives a power of direct taxation, unbounded and unlimited, exclusive power of聽legislation, in all cases whatsoever, for ten miles square, and over all places purchased for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, &c. What聽resistance could be made? The attempt would be madness. You will find all the strength of this country in the hands of your enemies; their garrisons will聽naturally be the strongest places in the country. Your militia is given up to Congress, also, in another part of this plan: they will therefore act as they聽think proper: all power will be in their own possession. You cannot force them聽to receive their punishment: of what service would militia be to you, when,聽most probably, you will not have a single musket in the state? for, as arms are聽to be provided by Congress, they may or may not furnish them.

Let me here call your attention to that part which gives the聽Congress power “to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia,聽and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the聽United States– reserving to the states, respectively, the appointment of the聽officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline聽prescribed by Congress.” By this, sir, you see that their control over our last聽and best defence is unlimited. If they neglect or refuse to discipline or arm聽our militia, they will be useless: the states can do neither–this power being聽exclusively given to Congress. The power of appointing officers over men not聽disciplined or armed is ridiculous; so that this pretended little remains of聽power left to the states may, at the pleasure of Congress, be rendered nugatory.聽Our situation will be deplorable indeed: nor can we ever expect to get this聽government amended, since I have already shown that a very small minority may聽prevent it, and that small minority interested in the continuance of the聽oppression. Will the oppressor let go the oppressed? Was there ever an instance?聽Can the annals of mankind exhibit one single example where rulers overcharged聽with power willingly let go the oppressed, though solicited and requested most聽earnestly? The application for amendments will therefore be fruitless.聽Sometimes, the oppressed have got loose by one of those bloody struggles that聽desolate a country; but a willing relinquishment of power is one of those things聽which human nature never was, nor ever will be, capable of.

The honorable gentleman鈥檚 observations, respecting the聽people鈥檚 right of being the agents in the formation of this government, are not聽accurate, in my humble conception. The distinction between a national government聽and a confederacy is not sufficiently discerned. Had the delegates, who were聽sent to Philadelphia, a power to propose a consolidated government instead of a聽confederacy? Were they not deputed by states, and not by the people? The assent聽of the people, in their collective capacity, is not necessary to the formation聽of a federal government. The people have no right to enter into leagues,聽alliances, or confederations; they are not the proper agents for this聽purpose. States and foreign powers are the only proper agents for this kind of聽government. Show me an instance where the people have exercised this business.聽Has it not always gone through the legislatures? I refer you to the treaties聽with France, Holland, and other nations. How were they made? Were they not made聽by the states? Are the people, therefore, in their aggregate capacity, the聽proper persons to form a confederacy? This, therefore, ought to depend on the聽consent of the legislatures, the people having never sent delegates to make any proposition for changing the government. Yet I must say, at the same time, that聽it was made on grounds the most pure; and perhaps I might have been brought to consent to it so far as to the change of government. But there is one thing in聽it which I never would acquiesce in. I mean, the changing it into a consolidated government, which is so abhorrent to my mind. [The honorable gentleman then went聽on to the figure we make with foreign nations; the contemptible one we make in聽France and Holland; which, according to the substance of the notes, he聽attributes to the present feeble government.] An opinion has gone forth, we聽find, that we are contemptible people: the time has been when we were thought聽otherwise. Under the same despised government, we commanded the respect of all聽Europe: wherefore are we now reckoned otherwise? The American spirit has fled聽from hence: it has gone to regions where it has never been expected; it has gone聽to the people of France, in search of a splendid government — a strong,聽energetic government. Shall we imitate the example of those nations who have聽gone from a simple to a splendid government? Are those nations more worthy of聽our imitation? What can make an adequate satisfaction to them for the loss they聽have suffered in attaining such a government –for the loss of their liberty? If聽we admit this consolidated government, it will be because we like a great,聽splendid one. Some way or other we must be a great and mighty empire; we must聽have an army, and a navy, and a number of things. When the American spirit was聽in its youth, the language of America was different: liberty, sir, was then the聽primary object. We are descended from a people whose government was founded on聽liberty: our glorious forefathers of Great Britain made liberty the foundation of every thing. That country is become a great, mighty, and splendid聽nation; not because their government is strong and energetic, but, sir, because聽liberty is its direct end and foundation. We drew the spirit of liberty from our聽British ancestors: by that spirit we have triumphed over every difficulty. But聽now, sir, the American spirit, assisted by the ropes and chains of聽consolidation, is about to convert this country into a powerful and mighty聽empire. If you make the citizens of this country agree to become the subjects of聽one great consolidated empire of America, your government will not have聽sufficient energy to keep them together. Such a government is incompatible with聽the genius of republicanism. There will be no checks, no real balances, in this聽government. What can avail your specious, imaginary balances, your rope-dancing,聽chain-rattling, ridiculous ideal checks and contrivances? But, sir, we are not聽feared by foreigners; we do not make nations tremble. Would this constitute聽happiness, or secure liberty? I trust, sir, our political hemisphere will ever聽direct their operations to the security of those objects.

Consider our situation, sir: go to the poor man, and ask him聽what he does. He will inform you that he enjoys the fruits of his labor, under聽his own fig-tree, with his wife and children around him, in peace and security.聽Go to every other member of society,–you will find the same tranquil ease and聽content; you will find no alarms or disturbances. Why, then, tell us of danger,聽to terrify us into an adoption of this new form of government? And yet who knows聽the dangers that this new system may produce? They are out of the sight of the聽common people: they cannot foresee latent consequences. I dread the operation of聽it on the middling and lower classes of people: it is for them I fear the聽adoption of this system. I fear I tire the patience of the committee; but I beg聽to be indulged with a few more observations. When I thus profess myself an聽advocate for the liberty of the people, I shall be told I am a designing man,聽that I am to be a great man, that I am to be a demagogue; and many similar聽illiberal insinuations will be thrown out: but, sir, conscious rectitude聽outweighs those things with me. I see great jeopardy in this new government. I聽see none from our present one. I hope some gentleman or other will bring forth,in full array, those dangers, if there be any, that we may see and touch聽them. I have said that I thought this a consolidated government: I will now聽prove it. Will the great rights of the people be secured by this government?聽Suppose it should prove oppressive, how can it be altered? Our bill of rights聽declares, “that a majority of the community hath an indubitable, unalienable,聽and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall聽be judged most conducive to the public weal.”

I have just proved that one tenth, or less, of the people of聽Americ–a most despicable minority–may prevent this reform or alteration.聽Suppose the people of Virginia should wish to alter their government; can a聽majority of them do it? No; because they are connected with other men, or, in聽other words, consolidated with other states. When the people of Virginia, at a聽future day, shall wish to alter their government, though they should be聽unanimous in this desire, yet they may be prevented therefrom by a despicable minority at the extremity of the United States. The founders of your own聽Constitution made your government changeable: but the power of changing it is聽gone from you. Whither is it gone? It is placed in the same hands that hold the聽rights of twelve other states; and those who hold those rights have right and聽power to keep them. It is not the particular government of Virginia: one of the聽leading features of that government is, that a majority can alter it, when聽necessary for the public good. This government is not a Virginian, but an聽American government. Is it not, therefore, a consolidated government? The sixth聽clause of your bill of rights tells you, “that elections of members to serve as聽representatives of the people in Assembly ought to be free, and that all men聽having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to,聽the community, have the right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed, or聽deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or that聽of their representatives so elected, nor bound by any law to which they have not聽in like manner assented for the public good.” But what does this Constitution聽say? The clause under consideration gives an unlimited and unbounded power of聽taxation. Suppose every delegate from Virginia opposes a law laying a tax; what聽will it avail? They are opposed by a majority; eleven members can destroy their聽efforts: those feeble ten cannot prevent the passing the most oppressive tax law; so that, in direct opposition to the spirit and express language of聽your declaration of rights, you are taxed, not by your own consent, but by聽people who have no connection with you.

The next clause of the bill of rights tells you, “that all聽power of suspending law, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without the聽consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and聽ought not to be exercised.” This tells us that there can be no suspension of聽government or laws without our own consent; yet this Constitution can counteract聽and suspend any of our laws that contravene its oppressive operation; for they聽have the power of direct taxation, which suspends our bill of rights; and it is聽expressly provided that they can make all laws necessary for carrying their聽powers into execution; and it is declared paramount to the laws and聽constitutions of the states. Consider how the only remaining defence we have聽left is destroyed in this manner. Besides the expenses of maintaining the Senate聽and other house in as much splendor as they please, there is to be a great and聽mighty President, with very extensive powers– the powers of a king. He is to be聽supported in extravagant magnificence; so that the whole of our property may be聽taken by this American government, by laying what taxes they please, giving聽themselves what salaries they please, and suspending our laws at their pleasure.聽I might be thought too inquisitive, but I believe I should take up very little聽of your time in enumerating the little power that is left to the government of聽Virginia; for this power is reduced to little or nothing: their garrisons,聽magazines, arsenals, and forts, which will be situated in the strongest places聽within the states; their ten miles square, with all the fine ornaments of human聽life, added to their powers, and taken from the states, will reduce the power of聽the latter to nothing.

The voice of tradition, I trust, will inform posterity of our聽struggles for freedom. If our descendants be worthy the name of Americans, they聽will preserve, and hand down to their latest posterity, the transactions of the聽present times; and, though I confess my exclamations are not worthy the hearing,聽they will see that I have done my utmost to preserve their liberty; for I never聽will give up the power of direct taxation but for a scourge. I am willing to聽give it conditionally;聽 that is, after non-compliance with requisitions. I聽will do more, sir, and what I hope will convince the most skeptical man that I聽am a lover of the American Union–that, in case Virginia shall not make聽punctual payment, the control of our custom-houses, and the whole regulation of聽trade, shall be given to Congress, and that Virginia shall depend on Congress聽even for passports, till Virginia shall have paid the last farthing, and聽furnished the last soldier. Nay, sir, there is another alternative to which I聽would consent;–even that they should strike us out of the Union, and take away聽from us all federal privileges, till we comply with federal requisitions: but聽let it depend upon our own pleasure to pay our money in the most easy manner for聽our people. Were all the states, more terrible than the mother country, to join聽against us, I hope Virginia could defend herself; but, sir, the dissolution of聽the Union is most abhorrent to my mind. The first thing I have at heart is聽American liberty: the second thing is American union; and I hope the people of聽Virginia will endeavor to preserve that union. The increasing population of the聽Southern States is far greater than that of New England; consequently, in a聽short time, they will be far more numerous than the people of that country.聽Consider this, and you will find this state more particularly interested to聽support American liberty, and not bind our posterity by an improvident聽relinquishment of our rights. I would give the best security for a punctual聽compliance with requisitions; but I beseech gentlemen, at all hazards, not to聽give up this unlimited power of taxation. The honorable gentleman has told us聽that these powers, given to Congress, are accompanied by a judiciary which will聽correct all. On examination, you will find this very judiciary oppressively聽constructed; your jury trial destroyed, and the judges dependent on Congress.

In this scheme of energetic government, the people will find聽two sets of tax-gatherers鈥攖he state and the federal sheriffs. This, it seems聽to me, will produce such dreadful oppression as the people cannot possibly bear.聽The federal sheriff may commit what oppression, make what distresses, he聽pleases, and ruin you with impunity; for how are you to tie his hands? Have you聽any sufficiently decided means of preventing him from sucking your blood by聽speculations, commissions, and fees? Thus thousands of your people will be most聽shamefully robbed: our state sheriffs, those unfeeling blood-suckers have,聽under the watchful eye of our legislature, committed the most horrid and聽barbarous ravages on our people. It has required the most constant vigilance of聽the legislature to keep them from totally ruining the people; a repeated聽succession of laws has been made to suppress their iniquitous speculations and聽cruel extortions; and as often has their nefarious ingenuity devised methods of聽evading the force of those laws: in the struggle they have generally triumphed聽over the legislature.

It is a fact that lands have been sold for five shillings,which were worth one hundred pounds: if sheriffs, thus immediately under the eye聽of our state legislature and judiciary, have dared to commit these outrages,聽what would they not have done if their masters had been at Philadelphia or New聽York? If they perpetrate the most unwarrantable outrage on your person or聽property, you cannot get redress on this side of Philadelphia or New York; and聽how can you get it there? If your domestic avocations could permit you to go聽thither, there you must appeal to judges sworn to support this Constitution, in聽opposition to that of any state, and who may also be inclined to favor their own聽officers. When these harpies are aided by excisemen, who may search, at any聽time, your houses, and most secret recesses, will the people bear it? If you聽think so, you differ from me. Where I thought there was a possibility of such聽mischiefs, I would grant power with a niggardly hand; and here there is a strong聽probability that these oppressions shall actually happen. I may be told that it聽is safe to err on that side, because such regulations may be made by Congress as聽shall restrain these officers, and because laws are made by our representatives,聽and judged by righteous judges: but, sir, as these regulations may be made, so聽they may not; and many reasons there are to induce a belief that they will not.聽I shall therefore be an infidel on that point till the day of my death.

This Constitution is said to have beautiful features; but when聽I come to examine these features, sir, they appear to me horribly frightful.聽Among other deformities, it has an awful squinting; it squints towards monarchy;聽and does not this raise indignation in the breast of every true American?

Your President may easily become king. Your Senate is so聽imperfectly constructed that your dearest rights may be sacrificed by what may聽be a small minority; and a very small minority may continue forever unchangeably聽this government, although horridly defective. Where are your checks in this聽government? Your strongholds will be in the hands of your enemies. It is on a聽supposition that your American governors shall be honest, that all the good聽qualities of this government are founded; but its defective and imperfect聽construction puts it in their power to perpetrate the worst of mischiefs, should聽they be bad men; and, sir, would not all the world, from the eastern to the聽western hemisphere, blame our distracted folly in resting our rights upon the聽contingency of our rulers being good or bad? Show me that age and country where聽the rights and liberties of the people were placed on the sole chance of their聽rulers being good men, without a consequent loss of liberty! I say that the loss聽of that dearest privilege has ever followed, with absolute certainty, every such聽mad attempt.

If your American chief be a man of ambition and abilities, how聽easy is it for him to render himself absolute! The army is in his hands, and if聽he be a man of address, it will be attached to him, and it will be the subject聽of long meditation with him to seize the first auspicious moment to accomplish聽his design; and, sir, will the American spirit solely relieve you when this聽happens? I would rather infinitely–and I am sure most of this Convention are聽of the same opinion– have a king, lords, and commons, than a government so聽replete with such insupportable evils. If we make a king, we may prescribe the聽rules by which he shall rule his people, and interpose such checks as shall聽prevent him from infringing them; but the President, in the field, at the head聽of his army, can prescribe the terms on which he shall reign master, so far that聽it will puzzle any American ever to get his neck from under the galling yoke. I聽cannot with patience think of this idea. If ever he violates the laws, one of聽two things will happen: he will come at the head of his army, to carry every聽thing before him; or he will give bail, or do what Mr. Chief Justice will order聽him. If he be guilty, will not the recollection of his crimes teach him to make聽one bold push for the American throne? Will not the immense difference between聽being master of every thing, and being ignominiously tried and punished,聽powerfully excite him to make this bold push? But, sir, where is the existing聽force to punish him? Can he not, at the head of his army, beat down every聽opposition? Away with your President! we shall have a king: the army will聽salute him monarch: your militia will leave you, and assist in making him king,聽and fight against you: and what have you to oppose this force? What will then聽become of you and your rights? Will not absolute despotism ensue?

The history of Switzerland clearly proves that we might be in amicable alliance with聽those states without adopting this Constitution. Switzerland is a confederacy,聽consisting of dissimilar governments. This is an example which proves that聽governments of dissimilar structures may be confederated. That confederate聽republic has stood upwards of four hundred years; and, although several of the聽individual republics are democratic, and the rest aristocratic, no evil has聽resulted from this dissimilarity; for they have braved all the power of France聽and Germany during that long period. The Swiss spirit, sir, has kept them聽together; they have encountered and overcome immense difficulties with patience聽and fortitude. In the vicinity of powerful and ambitious monarchs, they have聽retained their independence, republican simplicity, and valor. [Here he makes a聽comparison of the people of that country and those of France, and makes a聽quotation from Addison illustrating the subject.] Look at the peasants of that聽country and of France; and mark the difference. You will find the condition of聽the former far more desirable and comfortable. No matter whether the people be聽great, splendid, and powerful, if they enjoy freedom. The Turkish Grand Signior,聽alongside of our President, would put us to disgrace; but we should be as聽abundantly consoled for this disgrace, when our citizens have been put in聽contrast with the Turkish slave. The most valuable end of government is the聽liberty of the inhabitants. No possible advantages can compensate for the loss聽of this privilege. Show me the reason why the American Union is to be dissolved.聽Who are those eight adopting states? Are they averse to give us a little time to聽consider, before we conclude? Would such a disposition render a junction聽with them eligible; or is it the genius of that kind of government to聽precipitate people hastily into measures of the utmost importance, and grant no聽indulgence? If it be, sir, is it for us to accede to such a government? We have聽a right to have time to consider; we shall therefore insist upon it. Unless the聽government be amended, we can never accept it. The adopting states will聽doubtless accept our money and our regiments; and what is to be the consequence,聽if we are disunited? I believe it is yet doubtful, whether it is not proper to聽stand by a while, and see the effect of its adoption in other states. In forming聽a government, the utmost care should be taken to prevent its becoming聽oppressive; and this government is of such an intricate and complicated nature,聽that no man on this earth can know its real operation. The other states have no聽reason to think, from the antecedent conduct of Virginia, that she has any聽intention of seceding from the Union, or of being less active to support the聽general welfare. Would they not, therefore, acquiesce in our taking time to聽deliberate–deliberate whether the measure be not perilous, not only for us,聽but the adopting states?

Permit me, sir, to say, that a great majority of the people,聽even in the adopting states, are averse to this government. I believe I would be聽right to say, that they have been egregiously misled. Pennsylvania has, 聽perhaps, been tricked into it. If the other states who have adopted it have聽not been tricked, still they were too much hurried into its adoption. There were聽very respectable minorities in several of them; and if reports be true, a clear聽majority of the people are averse to it. If we also accede, and it should prove聽grievous, the peace and prosperity of our country, which we all love, will be聽destroyed. This government has not the affection of the people at present.聽Should it be oppressive, their affections will be totally estranged from it;聽and, sir, you know that a government, without their affections, can neither be聽durable nor happy. I speak as one poor individual; but when I speak, I speak the聽language of thousands. But, sir, I mean not to breathe the spirit, nor utter the聽language, of secession.

I have trespassed so long on your patience, I am really聽concerned that I have something yet to say. The honorable member has said,聽we shall be properly represented. Remember, sir, that the number of our聽representatives is but ten, whereof six is a majority. Will those men be聽possessed of sufficient information? A particular knowledge of particular聽districts will not suffice. They must be well acquainted with agriculture,聽commerce, and a great variety of other matters throughout the continent; they聽must know not only the actual state of nations in Europe and America, the聽situations of their farmers, cottagers, and mechanics, but also the relative聽situations and intercourse of those nations. Virginia is as large as England.聽Our proportion of representatives is but ten men. In England they have five聽hundred and fifty-eight. The House of Commons, in England, numerous as they are,聽we are told, are bribed, and have bartered away the rights of their聽constituents: what, then, shall become of us? Will these few protect our rights?聽Will they be incorruptible? You say they will be better men than the English聽commoners. I say they will be infinitely worse men, because they are to be聽chosen blindfolded: their election (the term, as applied to their appointment,聽is inaccurate) will be an involuntary nomination, and not a choice.

I have, I fear, fatigued the committee; yet I have not said聽the one hundred thousandth part of what I have on my mind, and wish to impart.聽On this occasion, I conceived myself bound to attend strictly to the interest of聽the state, and I thought her dearest rights at stake. Having lived so long–been so much honored–my efforts, though small, are due to my country. I have聽found my mind hurried on, from subject to subject, on this very great occasion.聽We have been all out of order, from the gentleman who opened to-day to myself. I聽did not come prepared to speak, on so multifarious a subject, in so general a聽manner. I trust you will indulge me another time. Before you abandon the present聽system, I hope you will consider not only its defects, most maturely, but聽likewise those of that which you are to substitute for it. May you be fully聽apprized of the dangers of the latter, not by fatal experience, but by some聽abler advocate than I!