Federalist 51: Madison's Unique Contribution to the History of Political Thought
In Federalist 51, Publius (James Madison) argues that the separation of powers described in the Constitution will not survive 鈥渋n practice鈥 unless the structure of government is so contrived that the human beings who occupy each branch of the government have the 鈥渃onstitutional means and personal motives鈥 to resist 鈥渆ncroachments鈥 from the other branches. 聽This argument made the essay famous, but it is another argument appended to it that Madison believes places the American system in 鈥渁 very interesting point of view.鈥 聽To what point of view is our gaze thus directed with this unusual (for Madison) expression of enthusiasm?
The main argument of Federalist 51 is that the various powers of government must be exercised separately and distinctly in order to 鈥済uard the society against the oppression of its rulers鈥. But even if society is thus protected from its 鈥渞ulers鈥, one part of society might still suffer injustice at the hands of another part of society. 聽The most important example is a majority, 鈥渦nited by a common interest鈥, that renders insecure the rights of a minority. 聽Federalist 10 taught us that the republican solution to this problem is to extend the sphere, that is, by means of a federal system to create a country so large in area and in the number and diversity of citizens and interests that it will be difficult for an interested majority to form.聽 The less famous part of Federalist 51 develops this line of thought.
Madison鈥檚 argument begins with two premises.聽 The first, as we also know from Federalist 10, is that a majority will almost inevitably act like a faction and oppress the minority. 聽The second is that 鈥渏ustice is the end of government.聽 It is the end of civil society. It ever has been, and ever will be, pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.鈥澛 To explain the political result to which these two premises lead, Madison describes what happens in a state of nature. 聽There, stronger people oppress weaker people, but the former are not so strong that they are unaffected by the attempts of the weaker people to obtain justice, to protect themselves.聽 In fact, in the state of nature, where there is no government, the 鈥渁narchy鈥 is so great that even the stronger people 鈥渁re prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak, as well as themselves.鈥
Madison then argues that something analogous occurs within every society. When a majority oppresses a minority, which it will almost always do where there is freedom, and then when a minority pursues justice, which it also will always do where there is freedom, anarchy and uncertainty are the result. Indeed, they become so great that everyone, even the majority whose misrule caused the problem in the first place, will be 鈥済radually induced鈥 to wish for a government that can protect all parties.
This seems like a good thing until we learn what such protection entails. For stability and security have been established historically only 鈥渂y creating a will in the community independent of the majority, that is, of the society itself.鈥 In a small society, the majority 鈥渟oon鈥 calls for 鈥渟ome power altogether independent of the people鈥. The requisite will or power must be independent of the majority, otherwise it could not restrain the majority. This method of solving the problem, Madison adds, 鈥減revails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority鈥, which are the two main ways of being independent of the people. In other words, rule by an hereditary king or by a Caesar or a general who seizes power in a coup are attempts to deal with a fundamental political problem, which is perhaps why Madison avoids here such odious terms as 鈥渢yrant.鈥 In any case, the idea is that even in republics, indeed, especially in republics where freedom permits interested majorities to form, citizens eventually come, for the sake of stability and security, to wish or to call for monarchy or a 鈥渟elf-appointed鈥 strong man.
This fact implies that republican government is doomed to fail. Fortunately, however, for the 鈥渟incere and considerate friends of republican government,鈥 there is another method of dealing with the problem: a properly constructed federal system. For on such a system we can create a country so large and disparate that factious majorities 鈥 majorities formed on any other principles than 鈥渢hose of justice and the general good鈥 鈥 become 鈥渧ery improbable, if not impracticable鈥. In this case, Madison explains, there will be less 鈥減retext … to provide for the security of the [minority], by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the [majority]: or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself.鈥
Thus, only a large republic can escape the political logic that leads from factional conflict to either authoritarian or hereditary rule. Stated positively, only a large republic makes possible self-government, or government wholly dependent on the will of the society with no participation at all of 鈥渁 will independent of the society itself鈥. Majorities in an extended republic will not always be just, but they will less often be unjust, and so minorities are much more likely to feel secure. The result is a more stable society as well as a more respectable one, for only in this system will the majority, which Madison here identifies with the people and even with the 鈥渟ociety itself鈥, deserve our respect as being (more often than not) a voice for 鈥渏ustice and the general good.鈥
Federalist 51 thus places American federalism in a 鈥渧ery interesting point of view鈥 in three respects.聽 First, it reveals what self-government means: not that each individual governs himself or herself, but rather that no entity that is 鈥渋ndependent鈥 of the society itself participates at any level in the government of society.聽 Unlike in Great Britain, where an hereditary monarchy and a House of Lords, both of which are independent of the people, share in governing, in America, every part of the government depends directly or indirectly on the people.聽 Secondly, while republican government is not unique to America, the argument indicates that only in a federal system like that found in America does republican government have a reasonable chance of maintaining itself.聽 Indeed, Federalist 51 suggests that the federal system is as essential as the separation of powers for the success of free government.聽 Thirdly, to his concluding statement of the idea that the larger the society, the more capable it will be of self-government, Madison adds the remark, 鈥渘otwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained.鈥 Among those contrary opinions is above all that of Aristotle, who argued that good government was possible only in a small polity.聽 In this view, the teaching on federalism may be the Federalist Papers鈥 most important contribution to the history of political thought.
